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aims to examine the impact of voluntary disclosure and characteristics of the audit 
committee towards earnings informativeness.  
 
The sample in this study focuses on the manufacturing sector company with the 
observation period 2011-2013. The statistics are used is multiple regression with Eviews 
software. This study found that the voluntary disclosure can not increase earnings 
informativeness. Furthermore, audit committee characteristics that are proxied by tthe 
audit committee members who have legal competence, finance accounting competence 
and total audit committee showed mixed results,only audit committee with legal 
competence and the total number of audit committee members can increase earnings 
informativeness.  
 
__ KEYWORDS: voluntary disclsoure, Earning, audit committee. 
INTRODUCTION Studies related to the disclosure of the company is growing rapidly 
today, one reason is that the disclosure in the annual report is considered to minimize 
the gap asymmetry of information between stakeholders and the company.  
 
After the Asian financial crisis, information transparency of companies have the caused 
much concern business Among members of the community. According to the World 
Bank and the Asian Wall Street Journal, publicly listed companies in South Asian 
countries are still grappling with the problem of low information transparency (World 
Bank, 1999 in Chien, 2007).  
 
purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of voluntary disclosure and audit 
committee characteristic on earnings informativeness manufacturing listed company in 
Indonesia. Research related to the relationship of voluntary disclosure and earnings 
quality have been carried out, studies that examine the value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure made by (Banghoj & Plenbor, 2008) showed that more voluntray disclosure 
does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings.  
 
Different result Came from Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) in 
(Banghoj & Plenbor, 2008) based on US Data both studies find that firms with are 
relatively more informative disclosure "bring the future forward" so that current stock 
returns reflect more in earnings news. The research found that from them also enhanced 
disclosure annual report do not make the current stock price more informative. _Chien 
et al.,  
 
2007 examined the relationship information transparency and informativeness of 
accounting earnings, the results of their study showed that information transparency 
infromativeness it will reduce the level of accounting profit for the sample of firms listed 
on the Taiwan stock exchange. A similar study tries to examine the level of 
informativeness of accounting profit with the implementation of corporate governance.  
 
Hermawan (2011) in that study tried to test the effectiveness of the board and the audit 
committee of Commissioners on earnings informativeness with measurement Earnings 
Response Coefficient (ERC) results showed that the more effective board of 
Commissioners would increase the informativeness of earnings. The results for the 
influence of the audit committee effectiveness are still mixed.  
 
The findings indicate that the effectiveness of the audit committee does not affect the 
informativeness of earnings, but further analysis indicates that the audit committee 
effectiveness has a positive effect on the ERC when the board ofcommissioners is not 
effective in performing its role. Based on reviews this studyindicates that the audit 
committee is an integral part of the board of Commissioners so that the role ofboard of 
Commissioners still have significant role in the monitoring function because the audit 
committee actually act on Behalf of and report to the board of Commissioners.  
 
Therefore, the role of the audit committee more will be revealed when the board itself is 
actually less effective. 
The contribution of this study was to test the simultaneous impact of several previous 
studies carried out separately ie voluntary disclosure and audit committee characteristics 
to earnings informativeness with a sample in the Indonesia manufacturing company.  
 
Studies that examine the factors that influence earnings informativeness has been done 
(hermawan, 2011); Woitdke and Yeh (2013); Okatvia (2014); (Banghoj & Plenbor, 2008) 
but studies have attempted to examine the characteristics of voluntary disclosure and 
audit committee simultaneously to earnings informativeness with the conditions listed 
company in Indonesia is still very rare.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPHOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Voluntary Disclosure and 
Earnings informativeness Research conducted by Gelb and Zarowin (2000) is a quite 
different,they are examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure with the 
informativeness of stock prices, the results indicate that enhanced results in voluntary 
disclosure in stock prices that are more informative about earnings, will be greater 
disclsoure provides information benefits to the stock market. Furthermore, Chien et al.,  
 
(2007) examined the relationship information transparency of companies listed on the 
Taiwan stock exchange of the informativeness of accounting earnings, empirical results 
show that information transparecy is positively associated with the informativeness of 
accounting earnings. Roychowdhury & Sletten (2012) uses a different approach related 
to voluntary disclosure are grouped into two groups: voluntary disclosure bad news and 
good news disclsoure to withhold voluntary.  
 
The result shows consistent with their prediction, that earnings' informativeness relative 
to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters. Their 
results can not necessarily be generalized to the context of Indonesia. Therefore, this 
research develops the research from (Banghoj & Plenbor, 2008) and trying to 
re-examine the impact of voluntary disclosure and the characteristics of the audit 
committee towards company's earnings informativeness using samples in Indonesia.  
 
Based on the descriptioan above, thenthe following research hypothesis will be: H1: 
Voluntary disclosure will increase earnings informativeness. Characteristics of the Audit 
Committee and earnings informativeness Research conducted by Hermawan (2011) tried 
to examine mechanisms of governance structure on earnings informativeness, board of 
Commissioners and the audit committee will be a proxy of the governance structure in 
the study.  
 
Results showed that the existence of governance structure such as board of 
Commissioners and the audit committee function implies a better monitoring on the 
financial reporting process that will result in higher _informativeness of earnings. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the monitoring function depends on how effective the 
board and the audit committee performed their duties.  
 
Previous research examines how the effectiveness of the board of Commissioners and 
the audit committee in a two-tier board structure influences the informativeness of 
earnings the which is measured by Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC). The level of 
effectiveness is defined as the extent to the which the board of Commissioners and the 
audit committee performed their duties according to their responsibilities, which is 
associated with the board and audit committee characteristics.  
 
Results of this study provide robust evidence that a more effective board of 
commissioners improves the informativeness of earnings. However, the results for the 
influence of the audit committee effectiveness are still mixed. The findings indicate that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee does not affect the informativeness of 
earnings, but further analysis indicates that audit committee effectiveness has a positive 
effect on ERC when the board of commissioners is not effective in performing its role.  
 
Based on these findings, this study indicates that audit committee is an integral part of 
board of commissioners so that the role ofboard of commissioners still have significant 
role in the monitoring function because the audit committee actually act on behalf of 
and report to the board of commissioners Penelitian serupa dilakukan oleh Gillan et al, 
(2003) yang menguji hubungan antara content of earnings (earnings response 
coefficients) and board and audit committee structure, the results shows that earnings 
are more informative the greater is the independence and the activity of the full board.  
 
Moreover, firms that have separated the CEO and board Chair positions appear to have 
more informative earnings. The results also found that audit committee characteristics 
influence the information content of earnings. In particular, firms that have smaller audit 
committees have more informative earnings.  
 
This study will use three proxy for measuring the characteristics of the audit committee 
(Oktavia, 2014), that are: (i) Audit Committee who has expertise in Accounting (ii) Audit 
Committee who has expertise in the field of law, and (iii) The number of members of the 
audit committee Based on the description above,then it was developed following 
research hypothesis: H2a : Expertise in the field of financial accounting that are owned 
by members of the audit committee increase earnings informativeness H2b : Expertise in 
the field of law which is owned by members of the audit committee increase earnings 
informativeness H2c : The number of audit committee members improve earnings 
informativeness.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD Research Model _ CARi,t _ n ? ? ARi,t i 
This model was used to test the effects of voluntary disclosure and audit committee 
characteristics to earnings informativeness. This model in this study were adopted from 
a model developed by Woidtke and Yeh (2013) and Chien et al., (2007). This research 
model differences with the model Woidtke and Yeh (2013) this research will addanother 
one independent variables that is voluntary disclosure Chien et al., (2007).  
 
the model (1) in this study: __ Variabel Operasionalization: CAR(Cumulative abnormal 
return) This variable is calculated by using the following steps: Calculatedactual 
returncompany i andmonth t,with this following equation: P ? P _CAR is a cumulative 
abnormal return over 12 months, from April in year t to March in year t + 1 and 
calculated on a monthly basis. Voldisc Voluntary disclosure index (voldisc) will adopt 
from Wondabio (2009) research instruments.  
 
The study used an instrument consisting of 67 items. Which detail the instrument can be 
seen in the apendix 2, to determine the value content analysis is used in each disclosure 
in the annual report the company and then next step will give a value of 1 if it is 
disclosed and the value 0 if not disclosed (dummy variable).  
 
Furthermore, the level of disclosure of information by each company (in an annual 
report which examined) will be calculated with total disclosure scoring divided by total 
disclosure item. Earnings This variable was measured by using net income before 
extraordinary items of firm i in year t-1 deflated by lagged total assets Audit Committee 
characteristics It uses several proxy variables (oktavia, 2014), that are: 
 Desc: _ it it ?1 it it ?1 _Acc This variable was measured by using a number of audit 
committee members who have expertise in the field of financial accounting.  
 
Members are said 
Rit = Actual return stock i in month t Pit = Closing price of the stock i in month t Pit-1 = 
Closing price of the stock i in month t-1 Determine the market return (composite index) 
in month t, which is calculated by the following formula: _to have financial accounting 
expertise if it meets one of the following criteria: Have a working experience in public 
accounting firms Has the profession as a public accountant (CPA certified) 
 Desc: _R ? IHSGt ? IHSGt ?1 mt IHSG _Have experience working as chief financial officer 
Having a financial accounting profession as a lecturer 
Rmt = Market return IHSGt = IHSG (closing price) in month t IHSGt-1 = IHSG (closing 
price) pada bulan t-1 Determine abnormal stock returns for each month, which is 
calculated by the following formula: ARt ? Rit ? Rmt Desc: ARt = Abnormal stock returns 
in month t Rit = Actual return stock i in month t Rmt = Return market in month t 
Determine the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) company i, which is calculated by the 
following formula: _In the profile of the audit committee stated that the member is an 
expert in the field of financial accounting Law This variable was measured by using a 
number of audit committee members who have expertise in law.  
 
Someone said experts in the fields of law if it is a law graduate from university or have a 
profession as a lawyer. Numb This variable was measured by using the total number of 
audit committee members. Leverage Variable leverage is control variables measured by 
the ratio of total debt divided by total assets lagged firm i in year t.  
 
Size1 This variable is a control variable in this study. Size1 measured using the natural 
logarithm of the total assets of firm i in year t. Size2 This variable is a control variable in 
this study. Size2 measured using the natural logarithm of the market value of equity of 
firm i in year t. Research Data The data will be analyzed in this research is secondary 
data obtained from the publication of the financial statements by _the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (BEI). The data is in the form of an annual report for the period 2011-2013 
were downloaded from www.idx.co.id.  
 
Sampel The population in this study is a company listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI). Samples in this study is a company engaged in the manufacturing 
sector. Samples companies engaged in the financial sector was not examined because it 
is different respect to their specific regulations. Summary selection of samples for the 
model (1) is presented in Table 1. 
 Tabel 1.  
 
Summary selection of samples Description _Jumlah _ _The number of observations for 3 
years (2011-2013) _420 _ _Profile of the audit committee are unclear _(35) _ _Data is 
incomplete _(37) _ _Outlier _(8) _ _Final sample for testing models (1) _340 _ _ 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION Descriptive Statistic Table 4.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables that used to test the model (1).  
 
From the table it is known _that the average voluntary disclosure of 29 items, it indicates 
that the sample in the average, their level of voluntary disclosure manufacturing 
companies tend to be lower when compared to the maximum value of disclosure of 65 
items. 
 Tabel 4.1 Descriptive statistics Model 1 Variable _Mean _Median _Maximum _Minimum 
_Std. Deviation _ _EARNINGS _4.16E+08 _16788599 _2.27E+10 _-2.04E+09 _2.01E+09 _ 
_VOLDISC _29.48824 _27.00000 _65.00000 _10.00000 _10.42673 _ _KOMAKUN _1.555882 
_2.000000 _3.000000 _0.000000 _0.767977 _ _KOMHUKUM _0.141176 _0.000000 
_2.000000 _0.000000 _0.357076 _ _TOTKOM _3.052941 _3.000000 _4.000000 _2.000000 
_0.282462 _ _LEV _0.654142 _0.567264 _2.491080 _0.034703 _0.429408 _ _LNTA 
_20.55423 _20.76958 _26.05878 _0.130000 _2.335838 _ _LNMVE _27.47341 _27.30302 
_32.86711 _23.35875 _2.247508 _ _N _340 _ _Tabel Desc: This table represents the 
estimation models using multiple linear regression. The dependent variable in this 
model is the CAR.  
 
the independent variable (i) EARNINGS measured by net income before extraordinary 
items of firm i in year t-1 dideflate by lagged total assets. (ii) VOLDISC measured by the 
ratio of the disclosure of the items listed in the annual report divided by the total of 
voluntary disclosure of items (iii) KOMAKUN measured by total audit committee 
members who have competence in the field of financial accounting (iv) KOMHUKUM 
measured by the total members of the audit committee who have the competence in 
the field of Law (v) TOTKOM measured by total members of the audit committee (vi) LEV 
is measured by the ratio of total debt divided by lagged total assets (vii) LNTA measured 
by total assets, natural companies (viii) LNMVE measured by the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity _ _ 
From the variable characteristics of the audit committee, audit committee members who 
have expertise in the field of financial accounting tend to be larger on average than 
_companies that have an audit committee members in the field of law or equal to 
0.1411 compared to 1.5558. 
Tabel 4.2  
 
Regression Result (Hyphothesis 1 & 2) Model Testing: CARit = _ a0 + a1Earningsit 
+a2Earnings*Voldisct+ a3Earnings*Akunit a5Earnings*Totkomit + a6 Lev +a7Size1it + 
a8 Size2?it _ +a4Earnings*Hukum _ + _ _Dependen Var: CAR _ _Independen Var 
_Expected sign _Coef _Probability _ _EARNINGS _+ _0.002973*** _0.0806 _ 
_EARNINGS*VOLDISC _+ _0.000402 _0.3519 _ _EARNINGS*AKUN _+ _-5.51E-05 _0.5259 _ 
_EARNINGS*HUKUM _+ _0.001351* _0.0024 _ _EARNINGS*TOTKOM _+ _-0.001070** 
_0.0403 _ _LEV _+ _0.307532** _0.0149 _ _LNTA _+ _-0.060163** _0.0366 _ _LNMVE _ 
_0.061026** _0.0164 _ _F Test _0.000019 _ _Adj R Square _0.083154 _ _Durbin Watson 
_1.869402 _ _N _340 _ _* Sig level 1% ** Sig level 5 % *** Sig level 10% _ _Tabel Desc: 
This table represents the estimation models using multiple linear regression.  
 
The dependent variable in this model is the CAR. the independent variable (i) EARNINGS 
measured by net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t-1 dideflate by 
lagged total assets. (ii) VOLDISC measured by the ratio of the disclosure of the items 
listed in the annual report divided by the total of voluntary disclosure of items (iii) 
KOMAKUN measured by total audit committee members who have competence in the 
field of financial accounting (iv) KOMHUKUM measured by the total members of the 
audit committee who have the competence in the field of Law (v) TOTKOM measured by 
total members of the audit committee (vi) LEV is measured by the ratio of total debt 
divided by lagged total assets (vii) LNTA measured by total assets, natural companies 
(viii) LNMVE measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity _ _ 
Results Before conducting the research hypothesis testing, first tested the classic 
assumption in advance and this research has been free from classical assumptions.  
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of testing the model (1) which aims to test whether 
voluntary disclosure and audit committee characteristics related to earnings 
informativeness. The first test conducted was to test the relationship wheater accounting 
earings can explain the abnormal return of stocks (Chien et al, 2007). In the test model 1 
show that, earnings and average abnormal returns have significant positive relationship.  
 
The results are consistent with research Chien et al, 2007, which means that the higher 
the reported earnngs, the larger the average abnormal returns on company stocks. 
Testing Hypothesis 1 stated that the voluntary disclosure of company will increase 
earnings infromativeness not proven. This suggests that voluntary disclosure by the 
company did not have an impact on earnings informativeness, these results was 
different with research that conducted by (Chien et al, 2007; _Roychowdhury & Sletten, 
2012) Their research showed a significant positive correlation between the earnings 
disclosure voluntary informativenss.  
 
Voluntary disclosure is the disclosure of the items that are not regulated by the 
regulatory institution so that voluntary disclosure can display a very different kind of 
information between companies and the different market conditions. Chien et al, 2007, 
using the ratio of long-term investment as a proxy for voluntary disclosure and this was 
different with this study.  
 
Probably selection of the appropriate information that is not addressed by market 
resulted in no significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
informativeness. hypothesis 2a testing showed that the relationship between audit 
committee members who have competence in the field of financial accounting and 
earnings informativeness not proven.  
 
These results are not in line with the research oktavia, 2014 in his research that the audit 
committee has competence in the field of Accountancy significant negative effect on 
earnings informativeness. The different results shown on hypothesis testing 2b, the audit 
committee has the legal competence positive significant 
effect on earnings informativeness.  
 
In this study showed that competence in the field of law is fairly small in amount, on 
average, it can provide a response to earnings informativeness. hypothesis 2c testing 
showed that total audit committee has a significant positive effect on earnings 
informativeness, these results are not in line with the research oktavia (2014).  
 
Total audit committees could be improved earnings informativeness, the mechanisms of 
good governance with the audit committee the supervisory role is able to raise earnings 
informativeness. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS This study aims to 
examine the impact of voluntary disclosure and characteristics of the audit committee 
towards earnings informativeness.  
 
voluntary disclosure Proxy in this research adopting the disclosure of wondabio (2009) 
item with some aspects (customer focus, internal business process, learning and growth, 
asset utilization, productivity improvement, revenu growth and other financial 
measurement). This study found that the voluntary disclosure with those proxy can not 
increase earnings informativeness.  
 
Furthermore characteristics audit committee are proxied by the of the audit committee 
members who have legal competence, financial accounting competence and total audit 
committee showed mixed results only legal competence and the total number of audit 
committee members can increase earnings informativeness. Limitations of this study 
were (1) proxy of voluntary disclosure needs to be renewed, it might the reason 
voluntary disclosure variable was not significantly associated with earning 
informatuvess.  
 
(2) the use of expertise in financial accounting definition less precise that causing 
variable accountancy expertise in the field of financial audit committee is not related to 
earnings informativeness. Further research is expected to contribute the most significant 
to be a proxy for voluntary disclosure items, the need for further research related items 
voluntary disclosure of information that is considered can provide incremental 
information for capital market participants.  
 
Furthermore, next research is expected to provide a more comprehensive description of 
relevant members of the audit committee who have competence in the field of financial 
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Appendix 1. Regression Output Dependent Variable: CAR Method: Least Squares Date: 
04/29/15 Time: 01:43 Sample(adjusted): 2 340 Included observations: 339 after adjusting 
endpoints White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance Variable 
_Coefficient _Std. Error _t-Statistic _Prob. _ _C _-0.484313 _0.364096 _-1.330179 _0.1844 _ 
_EARNINGS _0.002973 _0.001696 _1.752866 _0.0806 _ _EARNINGS*VOLDIS _0.000402 
_0.000432 _0.932266 _0.3519 _ _C EARNINGS*AKUN _ -5.51E-05 _ 8.68E-05 _ -0.634912 _ 
0.5259 _ _EARNINGS*HUKUM _0.001351 _0.000441 _3.061474 _0.0024 _ 
_EARNINGS*TOTKOM _-0.001070 _0.000520 _-2.058362 _0.0403 _ _LEV _0.307532 
_0.125699 _2.446565 _0.0149 _ _LNTA _-0.060163 _0.028661 _-2.099140 _0.0366 _ 
_LNMVE _0.061026 _0.025291 _2.412923 _0.0164 _ _LAGCAR _0.193747 _0.077184 
_2.510201 _0.0125 _ _R-squared _0.107567 _Mean dependent var _0.187723 _ _Adjusted 
R-squared _0.083154 _S.D. dependent var _0.559821 _ _S.E. of regression _0.536040 
_Akaike info criterion _1.619840 _ _Sum squared resid _94.53463 _Schwarz criterion 
_1.732702 _ _Log likelihood _-264.5629 _F-statistic _4.406123 _ _Durbin-Watson stat 
_1.869402 _Prob(F-statistic) _0.000019 _ _  
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